This paradigm shall be perceived as contrary to the ordoliberal economic philosophy 5 , which advocates that the aim of competition law is to create and protect the conditions of competition as such, and therefore sees competition as a value in itself and not just as a means by which purely economic objectives -such as efficiency -are to be achieved.
While the concept of the more economic approach originally comes from US antitrust law, it is claimed that it was the European Commission who largely inspired the increased role that economics has come to play in constructing competition under EU law, as well as merger cases 6 . As early as the 1990s, it began to move away from its ordoliberal stance towards a realignment of the goals of competition law with modern economic thinking on efficiency and consumer welfare. This gradual revolution, which covered not only the interpretation, but also the application of substantive law, is often called the 'more economic approach' 7 .
In general terms, the more economic approach to the application of EU merger law implies increased reliance on theoretical concepts from industrial economics and quantitative methods of analysis, firstly, in cases of investigations and, secondly, in formulating legislation and defining the criteria that are set 8 . In other words, a tendency of the 'more economic approach' in EU merger control is to base the assessment of each specific case on the assessment of its anti-and pro-competitive effects (effects-based approach), rather than on the form of the intrinsic nature of particular practice (form-based approach) 9 . It is, however, essential to understand that the more economic approach to the application of EU merger law covers different layers: substantive, procedural, organisational and practical. The substantive core of the more economic approach to EU merger control consists of the new prohibition criterion included in Merger Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 10 and the concept of efficiency defence. These substantive issues are, in turn, complemented by some procedural changes, which include inter alia an increase in the 5 Ordoliberalism, which was conceived in Germany in the 1930s and nurtured at the University of Freiburg, constitutes a comprehensive political and economic philosophy, which has, however, important implications for competition policy; v. Commission's investigative powers and an extension of time limits in complex cases. Moreover, the concept of the more economic approach is related to some organisational changes within the structure of DG Competition, which has led to the recruitment of industrial economists to enhance the Directorate General's economic capabilities. Finally, the more economic approach has also influenced merger control practice, which is particularly noticeable in the common use of quantitative analysis in competitive assessment of notified concentrations. . In order to enable the Commission to correctly appraise mergers, the substantive criteria of an assessment, which the Commission was required to undertake when a transaction fell within its jurisdiction, were laid down in Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. According to Article 2(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, a concentration had to be prohibited if it created or strengthened a dominant position, as a result of which effective competition were significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it. Taken literally, this would have implied a two-tier test involving proof of market dominance and the ensuing impediment of competition 19 . In practice, however, attention was focused almost exclusively on the establishment of market dominance 20 . The so-called dominance test, which could be described as a gradually refined application of the prohibition criterion, constituted the substantive part of the original Merger Regulation and was used for almost 15 years 21 .
Merger Control under EU Law

Beginnings of the More Economic Approach to EU Merger Control
Since that time, both political and economic circumstances have changed radically. Additionally, experience has shown that the substantive test, which was based solely on the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, also called the DPT test -against which mergers were examined -was not perfect. Its flaw was that it did not catch cases of 'unilateral effects' where the merged entity could raise prices even though it was not the largest player (sole dominance) and without the need for any tacit coordination with other players (joint dominance)
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. . In all of them, the General Court struck down individual merger prohibitions that were challenged by applications for annulment. Noticeably, the objections in the three above cases were very similar. In its main findings, the General Court charged the Commission with assessment errors of undoubted gravity by ignoring economic theory and failing to meet the required standards of proof. Undeniably, the General Court's severe criticism effectively raised the threshold for a prohibition decision in terms of the quality and quantity of evidence that the Commission must produce as justification.
As the above-mentioned judgements constituted an unprecedented defeat for the Commission, they also became an incentive for the legislator to rethink the structure of a substantive dominance test. Only two weeks after the General Court handed down the last of these three judgements, the then Commissioner for Competition, Mario Montithe first economist in the history of the European Union to hold this position -announced significant changes to the Commission's approach to EU merger control 27 . The subsequent result was the introduction of a new, more economic approach to EU merger control.
Merger Control under Regulation EC no. 139/2004
The Commission's new economic approach to EU merger policy was unlike its new approach to Article 101 and 102 TFEU, which was based solely on legally non-binding soft-law. Rather, it was based on a formal legislative amendment to its legal basis. was the existence of a significant 'gap'
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. The dominance test included in Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 did not allow the Commission to prohibit mergers that created an oligopolistic situation, even where they would have a negative impact on competition within the internal market 30 . Despite the fact that there was general agreement on the idea that the Commission should be able to prohibit such mergers, the negotiations proceeded with difficulty. The discussion over the new substantive test created two opposing blocs. According to some Member States (i.e. the UK and Ireland), the Council should use the experience of US merger law and introduce the 'substantial lessening of competition' test, also known as the SLC test, which is to be found in the Clayton Act. According to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the acquisition should be prohibited if it may have the effect of substantially lessening competition, or the tendency to create a monopoly 31 . 
The More Economic Approach in the Commission's Practice
Generally, the more economic approach can be perceived as a concept of realignment of the goals of competition law with modern economic thinking on efficiency and consumer welfare, which covers not only the interpretation but also the application of substantive law 40 . Nevertheless, the Commission's application of the more economic approach to EU merger law is characterized by several different implications.
The . Since then it has been clear that the Commission will prevent mergers that are likely to deprive customers of the benefits of competition, such as low prices, high quality products, a wider selection of goods and services and product innovations 43 . In other words, the Commission acknowledged that the purpose of EU merger law is specifically to protect and enhance consumer welfare.
Explicitly connecting the prohibition of mergers with consumer welfare has another very important consequence. The Commission redefined the substantive interpretation of EU merger law and at the same time narrowed down its purpose. According to this new approach, only those mergers which actually pose a danger to consumer welfare can be prohibited. This means that neither the possible damage to market structures nor the idea of freedom of competition, when taken alone, is enough to prohibit a concentration. The influence of the redefinition by the Commission of the purpose of EU merger law has to be considered as having an enormous impact on the concept of competitive harm. Furthermore, it was a real turning point in the Commission's approach. Not that long ago, in 2001, the Commission decided to prohibit the merger of two US companies, without even assessing the merger's potential impact on consumer welfare, which caused considerable tension between the European Union and the United States 45 . Although the new interpretation of the concept of competitive harm given by the Commission is very clear, it is not uncomplicated from the legal point of view. The Council amended the old Merger Regulation and adopted the new one, but did not make consumer harm an explicit condition of incompatibility with the internal market, as it was a purely 'European' solution 46 . . The legal definition laid down by the CJEU stated that the dominant position of an undertaking is attributed as economic strength which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and, ultimately, of its consumers 50 . The concept of dominance is broad and therefore covers not only an undertaking's ability to affect consumer welfare but also the ability to exclude competitors from the market, which could be detrimental to the competitive structure. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of dominance basically captures almost every form of economic strength.
The definition of dominance articulated by the CJEU in the context of decisions relating to Article 102 TFEU was already being used by the Commission while ap- , it does not discuss the concept of dominance in their substantive sections, neither in the Horizontal nor Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Instead, both Horizontal and Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines include a formula, according to which the Commission appraises concentrations by examining whether they are likely to generate anticompetitive effects or not 53 . Those effects, according to the guidelines, can either have a 'non-coordinated' or 'coordinated' nature. Non-coordinated effects, also referred to as 'unilateral effects', describe a situation where the elimination of important competitive constraints on one or more undertakings, resulting in increased market power, means that the merged entity gains the ability to increase prices and sustain the increase regardless of the behavior or reaction of other competitors on the market. Meanwhile, coordinated effects are those which arise when the concentration affects the nature of competition in such a way as to create or reinforce tendencies to parallel, uncompetitive behavior within an oligopolistic market 54 . In other words, the entity created by the concentration would not be able to sustain increased prices unless its competitors in the market refrain from price or other forms of competition, not as a result of collusive behavior but solely because each of the undertakings independently recognizes the benefit of not competing aggressively.
The definitions of non-coordinated and coordinated effects included in the merger guidelines seem to create a circumvention of the original dominance formula. On the one hand, the Commission retained the definition of dominance developed by the case law of the CJEU, as it refers to this definition in the recitals of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and thus chose not to reinterpret it as amounting to market power. On the other hand, however, the Commission, by introducing definitions of non-coordinated and coordinated effects in the merger guidelines, de facto read an unwritten market power requirement into the new SIEC test and thus, one could say, abandoned the original criterion of dominance 55 . Although the wording of the merger guidelines is far from unambiguous and unhesitating, the Commission's practice is already more clear and decisive. The Commission's new approach to EU merger control after adopting the recast Merger Regulation Economic efficiencies should be perceived as another implication of the more economic approach. In terms of merger control, economic efficiency gains, also known as efficiencies, are effects resulting from a concentration which may counteract a merger's negative effects on competition and therefore weigh in favour of an approval decision 57 . There are at least three arguments which support the rationale for taking into account efficiencies resulting from concentrations as a positive factor in concentration appraisal. First of all, the mergers deserve to be treated more benignly than cartels, as they are considered to be less harmful 58 . Therefore, if economic efficiencies are taken into account when appraising cartels 59 , there is all the more reason to consider them when evaluating mergers. Secondly, efficiencies may contribute to the achievement of the aims of the antitrust system, for example, through promoting consumer welfare or total welfare, and therefore provide a general benefit to society. Finally, concentrations may create efficiencies that increase competition on the market and such efficiencies should be especially encouraged. Although the above-mentioned arguments are irrefutable, the proper role of efficiencies in the appraisal of mergers has been one of the most controversial issues in the history of EU merger control . According to the guidelines, the Commission takes efficiencies into consideration as one part of the overall competitive assessment of a concentration. However, in the Commission's opinion, efficiencies may counteract a merger's harmful effects only if they cumulatively meet three conditions: (i) the efficiencies benefit consumers; (ii) are merger-specific; and (iii) are verifiable 64 . Since the merger guidelines contain a clear recognition of the phenomenon of efficiencies offsetting the anticompetitive effects of a concentration, one could expect the Commission's practice to be in the same vein. The reality, however, is different. Since adopting the new Merger Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, the Commission has never approved a merger with serious anticompetitive effects on the grounds of countervailing efficiencies 65 .This is not to say that merging parties in antitrust procedures do not try to demonstrate the existence of potential economic efficiencies of the notified concentration 66 . Finally, the Commission's new, more economic approach is first and foremost associated with the use of quantitative analysis in competitive assessments. Such analyses also play an important role in US merger law 67 . They vary between relatively straightforward win/loss analyses to much more complicated and sophisticated merger simulation models. But whatever the form of such quantitative analysis is, the aim is always the same: namely to balance a concentration's pro-competitive effects against its anticompetitive effects in order to determine whether the conduct is on the whole beneficial, neutral or detrimental to consumer welfare. The definition and results of econometric analysis sound perfect in theory but the truth is that not everybody agrees that its benefits outweigh its disadvantages. First of all, it must be pointed out that the results of quantitative analyses are not justiciable, as judges, who are usually not highly trained economists, cannot review them 68 . Others are of the opinion that using econometric analysis in legal assessments makes it more difficult to predict the end result of the case, and thus reduces legal certainty 69 . It is worth noting, however, that a more rigorous and economic analysis based approach is likely to lead to a significant increase in information which has to be provided by the parties of the antitrust proceedings. As a consequence, the Commission reviews the notified merger in much more detail, using the financial data prepared by bankers and analysts and internal documentation prepared in relation to the merger and markets concerned. All of this can only contribute to an increase in the transparency and objectivity of the whole procedure.
The reality in recent times is that econometric tools have often been applied in the Commission's competition practice 70 . From the formalistic point of view, the frequent use of econometric studies by the Commission has one more effect: increasing the length of time it takes the Commission to take prohibition decisions, which is influenced by numerous quantitative analyses 71 . One could assume that the use of quantitative analyses has fundamentally altered the Commission's approach to merger assessments. But such an opinion proves to be misleading on closer inspection. It is important to note that econometric tools have not replaced the legal test underlying the Commission's competitive assessment 72 . Furthermore, they very often only serve the purpose of establishing facts relevant to the previously carried out legal evaluation 73 . In such cases, the subsequent econometric calculations are simply regarded as additional evidence to the traditional, legal analysis of the relevant qualitative factors. So one could conclude that the use of quantitative analyses has not changed the Commission's approach to merger control at all, but merely supports evidence resulting from traditional, legal qualitative analyses which remain the fundament of the Commission's assessment.
Conclusions
The more economic approach to the application of EU merger law is a consequence of a gradual revolution which is spreading over different layers: substantive, procedural, organisational and practical, and must be seen in its wider context, as it covers not only merger control but competition law as a whole. The actual effect of this process is an interplay between the legal and economic issues present in merger cases, which has recently grown stronger. As a consequence, merger cases have become an intricate combination of legal arguments backed by solid economic analysis.
During the 1990s, the Commission had already begun to move away from its ordoliberal stance towards a realignment of the goals of competition law aided by modern economic thinking on the areas of efficiency and consumer welfare. Nevertheless, the major changes came later. The most significant was the adoption of the new Merger Regulation The effect of legal changes introduced by the above-mentioned legal acts is manifested in the Commission's practice. Analysis of the Commission's recent decisions leads to the conclusion that the Commission's more economic approach in EU merger control has several different implications. The most important of these implications should be recalled: the definition of the economic purpose of merger provisions; the new interpretation of the concept of competitive harm; the new attitude to the dominance criterion; the acknowledgement of efficiency gains as factors which may counteract a merger's harmful effects; and the popularization of quantitative analysis.
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